企业环境行为的三方动态博弈研究
PDF下载 (497)周晖杰,李 南,毛小燕.企业环境行为的三方动态博弈研究[J].宁波大学学报(理工版),2019,32(2):108-113.DOI:
ZHOU Hui-jie,LI Nan,MAO Xiao-yan.Research on tripartite dynamic game of enterprise environment behavior[J].Journal of Ningbo University(Natural Science & Engineering Edition),2019,32(2):108-113.DOI:
| Title: | Research on tripartite dynamic game of enterprise environment behavior |
| 作者: | 周晖杰, 李 南, 毛小燕 |
| Author(s): | ZHOU Hui-jie, LI Nan, MAO Xiao-yan |
| 关键词: | 企业环境行为; 政企合谋; 三方动态博弈; 环境规制; 纳什均衡 |
| Keywords: | enterprise environment behavior; collusion of government and enterprise; trilateral dynamic game; environmental regulation; Nash equilibrium |
| 分类号: | F273; X323 |
| 文献标识码: | A |
| 摘要: | 企业环境行为是政府、企业和公众之间复杂性博弈内在机制的具体表现, 是我国实现“创新、协调、绿色、开发、共享”五大发展理念的关键因素. 文章运用博弈论原理, 建立政府、企业和公众之间三方动态博弈模型, 对三方在企业环境行为中的利益关系进行均衡分析. 结果显示: (1)若企业排污获得的额外收益低于企业实施排污被发现后的罚款, 且社会公众对生态环境保护足够的重视, 三方的纯策略纳什均衡解为“不合谋、监督、不排污”, 反之纯策略纳什均衡解为“合谋、不监督、排污”; (2)混合策略纳什均衡状态不存在, 三方博弈结果依赖于各参数取值, 反映出企业环境行为博弈关系的复杂性, 但可以优化政府和公众决策选择偏好来规范企业环境行为. 根据博弈分析结果, 文章从建立生态环境损害赔偿制度、加强非政府组织参与环境监管、加大中央政府对地方政府监管力度、降低非正式环境规制的社会综合成本等几个方面提出企业环境行为的建议. |
| Abstract: | Enterprise environmental behavior is the internal mechanism of the complex game played among the government, enterprises and the public, and it is one of the key factors to achieve the development goals set for “innovation, coordination, greenness, development, sharing”. Based on game theory, in this paper a trilateral dynamic game model is built amidst the government, enterprises and the public in an attempt to analyze the interests in trilateral enterprise environmental behavior. The result shows that: 1) If the extra income of the enterprises resulting from the discharge is less than the fine after the implementation of pollution and the public have paid enough attention to ecological environment protection, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the tripartite agreement is: (Not Collusion, Supervision, and Not Pollutant Discharging). Otherwise, it is (Collusion, Not Supervision, and Pollutant Discharging). 2) Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium state does not exist, and trilateral game result depends on the parameter selection. The situations as such reflect the complexity of relations concerning enterprise’s environmental behavior, but the decision preference of the government and the public to regulate enterprise environment behavior can be optimized. Based on the analytical results, some suggestions are made on the environmental behavior of the enterprise from the perspectives of establishing the compensation system for the damage of the ecological environment, strengthening the participation of the non-governmental organizations in the environmental supervision, increasing the central government’s supervision over the local government, and reducing the social comprehensive cost of the informal environment regulation. |
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| 备注/Memo: | 收稿日期: 2018－05－15. 宁波大学学报（理工版）网址: http://journallg.nbu.edu.cn/ 基金项目: 国家旅游局项目（16TAAG023）, 宁波市教育科学规划课题（2018YZD001）, 宁波市社科规划课题成果. 宁波大学学报（理工版）网址：http://journallg.nbu.edu.cn/第一作者: 周晖杰（1979－）, 男, 浙江奉化人, 在读博士/副教授, 主要研究方向: 生态经济、企业环境行为. E-mail: zhouhuijie@nbu.edu.cn *通信作者: 毛小燕（1980－）, 女, 浙江衢州人, 讲师, 主要研究方向: 逻辑代数、模糊数学. E-mail: maoxiaoyan@nbu.edu.cn |
